Counter UAS for the Dismounted Soldier
I’ve recently had the pleasure of attending the Joint Readiness Training Center, also known as JRTC, down in Fort Polk, LA, and was put through the usual ringer of the typical US Army training exercise: extreme heat and humidity, the grueling ruck sack infiltration, eating MRE’s for days, and everything else that is part of a massive military training exercise. Going in, we knew that there would be new challenges not previously encountered in training exercises, partially due to the shift from the GWOT (Global War on Terror) counter-terrorism strategy to the new Great Powers Competition approach. Challenges include operating in a radio frequency (RF) denied environment, enemy soldiers with night vision and advanced weapons, and of course, the use of UAS. As a counter-UAS project manager and field operations technician in the civilian world, I thought I knew what to expect from small drones in terms of tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as their technical capabilities in flight. What blew me away was being on the receiving end of these things; being chased through the woods with nothing to detect or defeat a small UAS, having no safe haven or resources to protect us, and being completely vulnerable to whatever was flying overhead. We were on our own and it got me thinking differently of how dismounted troops can effectively protect themselves against enemy small UAS. The purpose of this paper is to provide a few suggestions and recommendations to our tech companies and military commanders to think holistically about this threat from the perspective of the dismounted soldier and what can be done now to protect them.
When I was in Iraq in 2016-2017 we encountered a whole new problem set that ultimately closed the airspace around Mosul and greatly limited coalition forces to conduct close air support. In other words, we lost air superiority to an insurgency that didn’t have an air force or advanced air defense weapons but used commercial off the shelf drones to stop us in our tracks. ISIS was successfully using drones as ISR, drop platforms for munitions, guided suicide attacks, and air defense against close air support. They were cheap, easy to procure, easy to fly, and provided excellent standoff – the perfect weapon for any insurgency fighting against a great power. During the battle of Mosul, ISIS showed the world how effective and reliable this technology was and paved the way for new battle techniques that are being used today.
Having been in the counter-UAS industry since 2018, I’ve had the unique opportunity of working with various types of systems and sensors that are highly effective against small UAS. I also learned very early on that there is no silver bullet for this UAS problem; there is no system, munition, or sensor that can effectively blow every single UAS out of the sky; the variation in UAS technology and tactics makes it extremely difficult to create a single system. The general term is layered defense, which any good tactician would understand when developing a defense plan. With the layered defense tactic in mind, the industry has developed systems that will the job done, utilizing a kill chain of detect, track, identify, and defeat (or some variant of this) that utilizes multiple systems to defeat a UAS. From swarms, to suicide drones, to GPS protected vehicles, there is technology out there that will effectively defeat a drone utilizing multiple sensors tied into advanced C2 systems. However, much of the research and development has been on fixed sites or mobile vehicle units that are protecting airfields, powerplants, and other high valued sites. Advances in high-powered lasers, directional jammers, net guns, and cyber capabilities (to name a few) that have shown to be effective against small UAS, but ultimately require a lot of support on the back end. This technology is often large, requiring a lot of electricity and manpower. Such technology is needed and should continue to be developed, but most are unrealistic to the ground soldier.
Here is my issue with a lot of the current tech: It isn’t feasible for the dismounted soldier. Returning to my JRTC experience, everything we had was out of a ruck sack – clothing, weapons, sleep systems, rain gear, communications equipment, spare batteries, med supplies, etc. (thankfully water and food was coordinated by resupply), and we simply didn’t have the space or weight capacity to bring more equipment. Furthermore, we operated out of patrol bases with no power sources, no organic vehicles for transportation, and were often confined to draws and other thickly vegetated areas that would limit the enemy finding us. We were also in an RF-denied environment which limited communications with our radios and phones, and we had people on the hunt trying and find our signature. Given these conditions, how do we add the threat of small UAS?
Here’s an anecdotal situation that we experienced in JRTC: we sent out a reconnaissance element for a 24 hour mission to watch and observe a small town where there was suspected enemy positions, as well as identify high value targets that could lead to following on missions. Upon their drop off site, they were immediately compromised and had to resort to their evasion plan which consisted of navigating thick vegetation and draws to an alternate pick-up site 5 kilometers away during the night. The icing on the cake was the constant harassment of small UAS that were flying over them for hours. Despite an unsuccessful mission, they were able to successfully evade the enemy and make it back to the patrol base safely. This frustrating experience brought up some good conversation about what it was like to be chased by small drones and what we could do if we have the same encounter. A few good lessons came out of it: vegetation is your friend, speed is security, defeat was not an option.
The recon element realized early on that when they were under thick vegetation, the UAS was flying in a search pattern looking for their location. Even though we had intel that the UAS had some sort of night vision or thermal capabilities, the unit was able to remain undetected as long as the soldiers stayed still under a thick canopy. When the drone flew away for what they assumed was a battery change, the element quickly moved to a new location as fast as possible, making the UAS to start over and conduct a new search pattern. Of course, if there were multiple UAS, this tactic would not have worked, but a single drone made it possible to move undetected. Finally, they realized that any type of interdiction from their weapon systems would have led to a compromise. Although they didn’t have a specific counter UAS weapon, they believed their firearms would have been effective to destroy the unmanned system but realized that this tactic only would increase their likelihood of compromise due to the UAS having GPS capabilities. A downed drone would have only pinpointed their location. So they continued to run and hide, and eventually outsmart the UAS and operator to get back to safety.
Throughout the training, we also encountered bigger class II UAS, from Ravens and Pumas, as well as the small DJI Mavics. To be honest, we were blown away by how restricted we were and how enemy drones changed the dynamics of the exercise. If it weren’t for the lights on the bottom of the aircraft (by JRTC regulation they had to have lights on at night), we would have had no idea that drones were looking for us during the periods of darkness. It was an eye-opening experience.
So, what were our options? How do you go out on an operation where you are limited to a backpack, carrying only mission essential equipment, and have to worry about a UAS overhead? How do you counter UAS in an RF-denied environment?
Here are a few recommendations and suggestions based on my own experiences, given that I have been exposed to the various technology as well as have been the guy on the ground who will inevitably encounter these things more and more:
1) Develop New Battle Drills: what is the most basic battle drill that every infantry platoon studies and trains? Battle drill 1a from FM 7-8, Platoon Attack. Soldiers train their battle drills so that every individual knows exactly what to do when they conduct an ambush, react to contact, or cross a linear danger area. Dismounted soldiers need the same battle drills when encountering an enemy UAS. Leaders need to develop tactics that will enable troops to react accordingly to a UAS threat, whether that is in a patrol base, on a reconnaissance mission, or on a dismounted patrol. When we were in our patrol base, we developed and practiced a battle drill to hide under cover and stay still in the event of a small UAS flying above us. We got excellent feedback from the operator later on that they had a very difficult time spotting our position due to our concealed fighting positions and rehearsals of our battle drills. A lot of emphasis has been put on developing technology to defeat small UAS, but sometimes going back to the basics is the best course of action. Environment, geography, and technology will all play a factor in this, but I encourage our military leaders to think about developing UAS-specific battle drills that troops can utilize and rehearse when in the field.
2) Understand the Environment: At JRTC, we immediately realized that the thick vegetation was actually a benefit to us during a UAS encounter. Our battle drills that we developed at our patrol base was soon utilized during our missions and we found that certain techniques were highly effective despite not having any counter UAS technology with us. The thick vegetation masked our location very well and made it very difficult for any UAS to find our location. Most of our route planning incorporated draws and wooded areas in case of a UAS encounter and when conducting a long halt we always ensured there was thick canopy above us. This isn’t anything new when conducting small unit tactics, but UAS should be added to the list of considerations when conducting patrols and route planning. The thick woods of JRTC was an advantage to us, but in open environments with little vegetation would have definitely changed our tactics if we encountered a UAS.
I was in Africa in 2021 to set up and train Air Force Security Forces on a counter-UAS system that was to protect an airfield from possible UAS. The system used radars as a means for detection and tracking which proved in the past to be highly effective. However, the environment we were in had a massive population of birds that was throwing off our detection system; we were getting a huge number of false positives. It was an issue that we had never encountered, and it made us think more critically about the geography and environment of where our systems are in use. Knowledge of the environment is key in any combat situation and counter UAS is no different.
3) Understand UAS Capabilities: Our recon element realized that the UAS chasing them (most likely a DJI Mavic) was greatly limited by its range and battery life. The drone would fly overhead for 15 minutes in a search pattern and then fly away for what was believed to be a battery swap. As soon as the coast we clear, they immediately moved locations as quickly as possible which enabled them to successfully evade detection. The UAS had to start its search all over again. We also found that their cameras were limiting as well; not in terms of resolution but what the operator can see on their screen. Depending on what an operator is looking through, it could be very difficult to see personnel and defensive positions, even if you are looking for it. Troops need to understand what they are up against in order to develop a plan of action during a UAS encounter; whether it is find cover, conceal positions, continue a foot movement, or even create conditions to use a counter-UAS system. Troops need more training and knowledge of what a small UAS can do, it capabilities and its limitations, to create an effective strategy during an encounter.
4) Size and Weight are Everything: I know it is hard, and the technology is still being developed, but dismounted troops need something small and light that will fit in their rucks or on their FLC or plate carriers that will give them some advantage. I’ve always believed some sort of RF sensor that identified a distance and direction of a UAS is a good start and it at least could give soldiers some time to react before a drone is flying overhead. But what do soldiers do when there is a UAS overhead? How can they defeat them? Much of our current systems are meant for base defense and fixed site, and use advanced technology like jammers, lasers, microwaves, or other sensors that require a lot of power, space, and personnel to operate effectively. How do we develop technology that is light weight, small, and easy to use for a single soldier on a patrol?
5) Repurpose What We Already Have: I’ve been stomping my foot about this one for years; we need to develop technologies that are integrated with existing systems. For JRTC, we carried around a 60mm mortar tube, a Carl Gustav anti-tank launcher, as well a Stinger cached for base defense. We don’t have the space to carry a single purpose system, but we can make room for a single purpose munition that fires from a mortar or other AT weapon. We are also extremely constrained by cost, and as much as we would like to use a stinger missile against a drone, it isn’t sustainable in the long run. How do we enable our ground troops to defeat UAS with an existing system they are already carrying?
For the time being, I think dismounted troops will have to rely on creating effective battle drills and rehearsals when encountering UAS. I do believe someone will develop an effective counter-UAS system that is tailored for the dismounted soldier that will fit into a backpack or FLC, but I haven’t seen it. Moreover, how do we consider counter-UAS when troops are operating in an RF-denied environment without air superiority, behind enemy lines? GWOT has made us complacent in that we were always used to owning the sky and radio waves, but current world conflicts are changing the dynamics of the battlefield.
Once again, these are the opinions and recommendations of one man, but something I believe to be valid in observation. There isn’t a silver bullet for this threat, and I believe that the only way to solve this problem is for our private sector companies to pool resources together and work collaboratively with the government to create effective technology to keep American assets and personnel safe. I’ve met with some of the smartest engineers who are working every day to tackle this problem. We should also strive to educate, advise, and guide our service members at all echelons to better understand the UAS threat and provide the necessary information and instruction of UAS capabilities as well as the technology to counter it. This threat isn’t going anywhere, and it is up to us to work together to find real solutions to keep our assets safe and our troops on the ground mission capable of completing their objectives.
Post Script: This is an independent work and all opinions are of my own. I welcome constructive criticism as well as corrections on my thinking. This document is considered Unclassified.
